seems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and consequently the thing taken for an un-questionable truth, that the Ditheistic doctrine of a good and evil principle was the Catholic or universal doctrine of the Pagan Theists, and particularly that Plato, above all the rest, was a professed champion for the same; we shall therefore make bold to examine Plutarch's grounds for this so confident-assertion of his; and principally concerning Plato. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to Plato, are only these three, which follow. First, because that philosopher, in his *Politicus** speaks of a necessary and innate appetite, that may sometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cause disorder and * confusion: Secondly, because, in his tenth *De Legibus,* he speaks of two kinds of souls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and, lastly, because in his Timaeus he sup-poseth the rftatter to have been moved disorderly before the world was made; which implies, that there was a disorderly and irrational soul consisting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itself. But as to the first of these allegations, out of Plato's *Politicus,* we shall only observe, that that philosopher, as if it had been purposely to prevent such an interpretation of his meaning there as this of Plutarch's, inserts these

very words | *JJH^T av* Svo rtve 0£o), f^povovvfE lavrotc cvavrta crrpe<j>£iv *avrov.* Neither must any such thing be supposed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens sometimes one *way, and sometimes another. —-Which

[a] P, 176. open [b] Ibid, p. 175.